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Universals, Necessities, and  
Social Contexts
David Moshman, Educational Psychology,  
University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0641
Abstract
Elbers* does an excellent job of integrating, analyzing, and extending recent theo-
retical and empirical work concerning the relation of learning and development. 
The purpose of this commentary is to challenge Elbers to address the difficult 
question of universal sequences in human development. In order to focus the is-
sue, a specific sequence in the development of logical reasoning is proposed.
Keywords: development, interactionism, logic, necessity, reasoning
Among psychologists and others interested in human learning, cog-
nition, development, and education, there has been a major and long-
standing division between those who see knowledge as a structure ac-
tively constructed by the individual mind (and education thus as the 
facilitation of such internally driven construction) and those who see 
knowledge as information and skills internalized from the environment 
(and education thus as a process of active transmission from teacher to 
learner). With the rise of information-processing, Vygotskian, and neo-
Piagetian perspectives, this division has been somewhat muted by in-
creasing recognition that knowledge emerges from a complex interac-
tion of internal and external forces, that person and environment both 
play active roles in learning and development, and that simplistic views 
of purely individual construction or direct environmental transmission 
cannot possibly be adequate.
Unfortunately, it is much easier to come up with appealing interac-
tionist rhetoric than to produce specific, testable theories that are genu-
inely interactionist. Most attempts to construct interactionist theories end 
up producing theories that are either basically Piagetian with a nod to-
ward the importance of environmental factors or basically environmen-
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talist with a nod toward the active nature of the mind. Despite the most 
earnest efforts of numerous highly competent psychologists, fully inter-
actionist theories have been surprisingly difficult to produce.
There are, however, some ongoing efforts that hold real promise 
with respect to genuinely transcending the traditional dichotomies of 
active mind vs. active environment, individual vs. society, construction 
vs. transmission, development vs. learning, etc. Elbers does an excellent 
job of summarizing, integrating, criticizing, and extending this work. He 
not only performs a major service in presenting some important current 
trends and debates within developmental psychology to a broader audi-
ence interested in education, but manages simultaneously to make a sig-
nificant contribution to the ongoing efforts in this area.
There is nothing in the article that I particularly disagree with. I do 
wonder, however, how Elbers would extend his perspective to address 
some other issues. I would like to direct my commentary, then, to raising 
a set of difficult issues that I would like to see Elbers address.                 
At the core of the issues I have in mind is the universality of devel-
opmental sequences. Piagetian theories generally propose that certain 
sequences of development are universal because they lead naturally to 
higher levels of equilibrium (or adequacy, or something of that sort). 
Such a claim is at odds with the socialization view that development is 
fundamentally relative to culture.
Where would an interactionist stand on this? I think this is the point 
at which interactionists generally show their true colors, revealing them-
selves to be, at heart, either developmentalists or environmentalists.
To the extent that a particular interactionist view is really develop-
mental at its core, its proponents would probably maintain that certain 
sequences are universal in the sense that each step must precede the 
next and can only be followed by the next. This is not to deny that inter-
action with the environment is necessary for development to occur and 
that the nature of the environment may substantially facilitate or hinder 
development. The point is that, regardless of one’s social context, one 
must reach stage 2 of a given sequence before one can proceed to stage 
3, and if one moves beyond stage 2 it can only be to stage 3. There is a 
natural progression toward greater equilibrium (or truth, or self-reflec-
tion, or rationality, or whatever) that results in a sequence that is uni-
versal regardless of the language, culture, or point of view underlying 
one’s socialization.
To the extent that a particular interactionist view is really environmen-
talist at its core, on the other hand, its proponents would likely maintain 
that what gets constructed depends on the environment with which one 
interacts. This is not to deny that knowledge is actively constructed by 
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the mind rather than internalized from the environment. The point is that 
the direction of development (not merely its rate) is relative to social con-
text. There are no sequences that must be followed. Behavior and knowl-
edge are entirely a function of language, culture, or viewpoint.
I think we can readily agree that many important behavioral changes 
are a function of social context and that knowledge is at least in part rel-
ative to language, culture, and point of view. The question is whether 
there are any universals or necessities.
Having come this far, I might as well go right to the edge of the preci-
pice: Let me propose a specific sequence and claim that it is universal (see 
Moshman, 1990; Moshman and Lukin, 1989). Fairly young infants show 
behavior that corresponds to certain logical norms (Langer, 1980). Con-
sider, for example, an infant who knows that an object is under the chair 
or the couch, fails to find it under the chair, and then immediately looks 
under the couch. Such an infant is behaving in accord with the disjunc-
tive scheme p or q; not-p; therefore, q. Preschool children respond to verbal 
problems in ways that suggest a similar application of implicit inference 
schemes (Hawkins et al., 1984). Moreover, there is reason to think that 
such inference schemes reflect underlying logical necessities that are not 
entirely relative to language or culture (see Braine and Rumain, 1983, for 
a plausible set of such schemes). We may therefore suggest that normal 
human beings in any culture will progress from the sensorimotor appli-
cation of certain inference schemes that are largely the same in any cul-
ture to (stage 2) application of such schemes at a level of representational 
cognition.
We can even take this further. There is evidence that beginning about 
age 5 or 6 children show sufficient metacognitive reflection on their own 
inferences to recognize inference as a distinct source of knowledge (So-
dian and Wimmer, 1987) and to distinguish logical necessities from mere 
conventions or empirical regularities (Somerville et al., 1979). Cultures 
may differ in what proportion of individuals achieve this third stage and 
at what age they achieve it, but I doubt if they differ with respect to the 
fundamental nature of this third stage (i.e., in what inferences are identi-
fied as logically necessary). Moreover, there is evidence that, beginning 
about age 11 or 12, at least some individuals in some cultures achieve a 
fourth stage at which they can understand the validity of formal argu-
ments independent of their content (Moshman and Franks, 1986). Thus, 
for example, they understand that if elephants are animals or plants, and 
elephants are not animals, then elephants are plants.
What will Elbers say about all this? No doubt he will insist that mak-
ing a proper inference involves recognizing when such an inference is 
called for and may, in complex tasks, require strategies for application 
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of one’s logical knowledge. Moreover, such utilization and procedural 
competencies may be taught and such teaching may play an important 
role in the development of basic logical principles. Furthermore, vari-
ous cultures may differ dramatically in the extent to which they encour-
age and support logical reasoning. Individuals in some cultures may de-
velop much more rapidly than individuals in other cultures. There may 
be some cultures where development beyond the second or third of the 
above stages is rare or nonexistent. I happily grant all of this.
So where does that leave us? If Elbers is willing to acknowledge that 
some deductive inferences are logically necessary, that others are falla-
cious, and that development naturally moves toward increasingly appro-
priate inference schemes and increasingly abstract metacognitive reflec-
tion on the formal properties of such schemes, then I think his view is 
essentially developmental. This leaves plenty of room for specific social-
ization experiences and broader cultural contexts to influence develop-
ment but still acknowledges cross-cultural universals and necessities.
If, on the other hand, Elbers maintains that the logic one constructs is 
entirely a function of one’s language, culture, and/or socialization expe-
riences and that there is thus no natural, universal route in the develop-
ment of logical reasoning, then I think his view is essentially environmen-
talist. This leaves plenty of room for active construction by the individual 
but accords the environment the power not merely to facilitate the devel-
opment of logical reasoning but to actively determine its course.
There may, of course, be other possibilities, or even radically different 
ways of framing the issue. I’m really not sure, on the basis of his article, 
what Elbers will say about all this. I hope the readers of this exchange are 
as curious as I am to find out.
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